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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
STEVEN M. JOHNS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16218 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of one count 
of aggravated kidnapping in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-302 (1) (b) (1953), as amended, and two counts of 
aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended. The case was tried 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge, 
presiding. Appellant now appeals from a verdict and 
judgment of guilty rendered on November 28, 1978. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping and 
two counts of aggravated sexual assault. Pursuant to the guilty 
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verdict, appellant was sententenced to a term of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict 
and judgment of guilty rendered in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 12th day of October, 1977, the 
appellant and his girlfriend, Joyce Johnson, were at 
the Mountaineer Club in Wellington, Utah. They were 
both drunk, as they had been drinking for several hours 
(T.9,10,133). The appellant was "fooling around all 
over," playing with Ms. Johnson's breast, "rubbing all 
over her chest and playing around with her stomach." 
(T.lO). Sometime between 7:00 and 8:00p.m., Hs. Johnson 
asked the prosecutrix, Gloria Dix, if she (Gloria Dix) 
would agree to take her (Joyce Johnson) to her home in 
Woodside in return for filling Gloria's truck with gas 
(T.ll,20,21). The prosecutrix agreed, driving her truck 
around to the side of the Mountaineer Club, where Ms. 
Johnson "loaded" the appellant into the truck (T.21). 
Appellant was passed out and had been sleeping due to 
his high state of inebriation (T.21,120,138-139). While 
the appellant was being put in the truck, the prosecutrix 
went to buy a case of beer at Joyce Johnson's request 
(T.21,49,123). The prosecutrix was not drinking at the 
time nor had she partaken of any alcohol or drugs that 
day (T.l5,21,46). 
-2-
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The three then proceeded to Mr. Johnson's 
aunt's house, where Ms. Johnson and the appellant had 
a few more beers (T.21,123-124). The prosecutrix, 
noticing that Ms. Johnson and the appellant were "getting 
pretty loose" and "kind of getting loud,'' "flopping all 
over and stuff," told them that she had to be getting 
back to the Mountaineer Club so that she could talk 
with her former husband regarding a reconciliation 
of their marriage (T.21-22,109-110). 
Leaving Ms. Johnson's aunt's house, the 
prosecutrix and her traveling companions began driving 
towards Woodside (T.22,124). Upon arriving at Ms. 
Johnson's home in Woodside, it became evident that 
her mother did not want the appellant to spend the 
night at her home (T.23). The appellant then asked 
the prosecutrix if she would mind giving him a ride 
back to Wellington (T.23), to which she replied that 
she would take him as far as the Mountaineer Club (T.23). 
The two departed for Wellington, and after 
having traveled approximately one-quarter to one-half 
mile, appellant threw his arm around the prosecutrix 
(T.24,140-141). She "threw his arm off" and told 
him that "Danny (her ex-husband) would kill him for 
-3-
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less than that" (T.24,141). Appellant then slid away 
from her and pulled a knife with a blade approximately 
eight to ten inches long, pushing it against her 
throat (T.24). 1 (Appellant, at trial, admitted pulling 
out a knife, but denied putting it against her throat 
(T.l41).) He then told her to pull the truck over. She 
replied that she had to find a better place to pull 
over, whereupon he pushed the knife harder against her 
throat, demanding that she pull over "Right now." 
(T.24). She pulled the truck over and they changed 
places (T.24). He very threateningly demanded at the 
point of a knife that the prosecutrix take all her 
clothes off (T.25). She told him to put the knife 
away, but he responded by telling her to get her 
clothes off and not to say another word (T.25). The 
prosecutrix testified she did not fight back at the 
appellant because the knife was at her throat (T.52). 
She further stated that he kept trying to touch her 
all over, including her private parts (T.25). As he 
took off driving, he told her to "shut up and just do what 
I tell you." (T.26). He continually touched here, asking 
her at one point, "Have you ever been fucked in the ass." 
(T.26). She then questioned the appellant in a pleading 
1 The prosecutrix received a small cut from the knife on 
her throat. The cut bled enough to form a scab, which 
Danny Dix and Pat Safely (the prosecutrix's mother) later 
observed (T.24,25). 
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manner as to why he was doing this to her and asked what 
had she ever done to him (T.26,27). She testified at 
trial that she was "waiting for a chance to make a break 
and get to the door" (T.27). As they approached the 
outskirts of Wellington, appellant told ber that he could 
not take her into Wellington because she lived there (T.27), 
at which time he turned the truck around, traveled about 
a half mile, then turned onto a dirt road and parked 
the truck (T.27,28). The appellant removed the keys 
from the truck's ignition (T.28), and began drinking 
more beer (T.28). He told the prosecutrix to take her 
tampax out (T.66). He then forced her to have sexual 
intercourse against her will (T.29-30,61,144). Appellant 
also forced her to commit sodomy, forcing her mouth onto 
his penis, holding and pushing her head down to the point 
where she was gagging (T.28,59,144). The appellant, when 
asked at trial as to whether or not the prosecutrix gave 
any objection to this type of conduct, replied: "Well, 
it's not an objection deal. You know, when you're in that 
situation, it feels better . to hold them down there. 
You know, it's a better feeling. It's part of sex." 
(T.l44-145). He also responded, when asked at trial whether 
or not he had any indication that the prosecutrix was 
-5-
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resisting, that "· •• Yes. I had to ••• the feeling 
that I was going too long, yes." (T.l46). 
The prosecutrix testified at trial that she 
tried to resist this entire ordeal (T.59), but when she 
tried to turn away she was overpowered (T.59). She 
further stated that she felt as if the appellant was 
going to take her life (T.29,31,57,64). Each time she 
would resist, the appellant would hurt her even more 
(T.64). At one point, he told her that "all her troubles 
would be over" when they went to Indian Canyon (T.31, 
67), and that "she had a right to be scared." (T.33). 
When asked why she did not try to use a knife she was 
carrying at the time, the prosecutrix stated that she 
tried to get possession of it, but was not allowed to move 
her hands, only to keep them at her side (T.30,31,52,58, 
62). Finally, the prosecutrix stated at trial that the 
intercourse was against her will (T.63,64), that she 
objected because some man who she did not know was "making 
me do something against my will" (T.65) with a knife at 
her throat (T.71), and that the appellant never asked her 
if she would do anything, he just made her do it (T.69). 
The prosecution also testified that appellant ejaculated 
on her chest, and that she wiped it off with her shirt 
(T.30,150). This was corroborated by appellant (T.l50), 
and by the state's V.'i tness, Ja..'":les Gaskill, the Di:cector 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the Criminal Laboratory at Weber State College, who 
testified that he found semen stains on the chest area of 
the prosecutrix's T-shirt (T.ll4). Mr. Gaskill also 
testified that he had found blood stains on the crotch 
area of one of the T-shirts (Exhibit No •. 2), and also 
near the bottom on the front of another T-shirt (Exhibit 
No. 3) (T.ll4,115). The blood type was type "A" human 
blood, the same type as that of the prosecutrix (T.llS). 
Following these sexual assaults on the 
prosecutrix, appellant drove the prosecutrix to Price, 
where she talked him into permitting her to go inside 
at the Gas-N-Go store to purchase a 7-Up (T.36). Upon 
entering, she told the attending lady, Joy Lott, that 
she had been raped and asked her to call the police (T.38, 
73). Ms. Lott later stated at trial that the prosecutrix 
at the time of this incident was shaking--near tears (T.73), 
and that she (prosecutrix) broke down and started crying 
the minute the police arrived (T.75-76). The prosecutrix 
was, as Ms. Lott described, "frantic" (T.74). 
Upon the arrival of the police, the appellant 
"took off like a shot," squealing the tires on the 
prosecutrix's truck as he began his evasion of the 
police (T.39,75,79). Several miles later, appellant 
was cornered by the police, got out of the truck, and ran 
-7-
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(T.B0-81). Officer Joe Ori, one of the officers who 
gave chase, stated at trial that he noticed the 
appellant trying to take off a belt as he was driving 
(T.BB). A knife was later found by Officer Ori on·the 
side of the road near the driver's side of the truck 
which the appellant was driving (T.86,95). This knife 
was shown to the prosecutrix at the police station, 
and she stated that it did not belong to her. She had 
already recovered her own knife (T.94-95). 
When appellant abandoned the prosecutrix's 
truck, he ran and hid in the woods, where he was 
eventually found, apprehended, and arrested by Officer 
Ori (T.89,90). 
The prosecutrix was taken to the hospital 
that same night (actually early morning) where she was 
examined by a doctor (T.lOl). Margaret Robertson, a 
licensed practical nurse who was present during the 
examination, testified that the prosecutrix seemed to be 
very upset, very depressed, and crying (T.l02-103). She 
also observed bruises on the prosecutrix, quite a few 
contusions on her neck and breast area and some abrasions 
around the vaginal opening as well as contusions inside 
the opening (T.l03,104). The doctor's report confirmed 
this (T.l03,104). The prosecutrix, at the time of the exam, 
-8-
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stated that they would find no sperm inside her because 
the appellant had ejaculated on her chest (T.l0?-108). 
Also present at the hospital were the prosecu-
trix's mother and ex-husband, who both testified that they 
observed bruises on her breast as well as scars on her 
neck and scratches on her thighs (T.l2,110). The 
prosecutrix testified that the appellant had bit her 
and pinched her, as one of her nipples had bled and 
she noticed herself badly bruised (T.39,40). 
Officer Vuksinick testified that when he saw 
the prosecutrix at the hospital she appeared awfully 
upset--her eyes puffed, swolen, and very red as if she 
had been crying (T.82-83). Officer Ori stated that 
upon encountering the prosecutrix after she had been to 
the hospital the night she was raped, she was so shaken it 
was hard for her to talk (T.93). 
During a pre-trial conference and in chambers, 
the prosecution made a motion in limine to prevent 
appellant from "going into prior sexual matters of the 
victim" (T.3). The motion was made because at the 
preliminary hearing, appellant's counsel, over objection 
by the prosecution, went into some prior sexuai 
relationships involving the prosecutrix. Questions 
-9-
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such as, "Does she like to make comparisons with other 
menJ did she like to have sex during her period" were 
asked, as well as questions involving whether she had 
been involved previously in "male sex" with other 
people (T.3). 
The trial court granted the prosecution's 
motion, and in explaining to appellant's counsel its 
reasoning, stated: 
(T. 5). 
(T. 5). 
. It's the Court's opinion 
that--it's true you're entitled to go 
into her [prosecutrix's] predisposition 
as to general reputation, but I don't 
think you're entitled to go into any 
specific acts, whether they involve her 
personally or with someone else, which 
obviously has to be in a sexual situation. 
But you're limited to general reputation 
and general reputation means what it 
says, general reputation in the 
community, what it means to people. 
And you can't go beyond that in the 
Court's opinion. So the Court is going 
to grant the motion to limit any type of 
questions you ask--not to get into any 
sexual desires as far as she is concerned 
regarding specific acts. So you're going 
to be limited to general reputation. 
The Court went on and stated further: 
... we're going to limit it strictly 
to reputation. But if you have witnesses 
who can testify to her general reputation 
in the community, then, of course, those 
witnesses can so testify. But until the 
matter of reputation is opened up by one 
side or the other, there can't be any questions 
about the prior conduct. That's the ruling 
of the Court. 
l (\ 
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The trial court later modified its order 
granting the prosecution's motion in limine, allowing 
appellant's counsel to examine witnesses and the 
prosecutrix relative to the sodomy charge regarding 
any sexual preference that the prosecutr~x may have 
had as showing an inclination as to whether she 
consented or not: 
(T. 6-7). 
• • . The Court at this time 
is going to modify its order previously 
made in limine, in that the Court feels 
in a charge of sodomy, which we have 
in this case, that the defendant would 
be entitled to ask the alleged victim 
relative to any sexual preference that 
she might have, as showing an inclina-
tion as to whether she consented or 
not. However, the Court will retain 
the order relative to limiting any 
specific acts with any specific people 
on any other occasions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR, UNDER THE CONTROLLING DECISIONS OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT, THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
AND THE DECISIONS AND STATUTES OF THE MAJORITY 
OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS, IN GRANTING THE 
PROSECUTION'S MOTION IN LIMINE. 
Prior to the trial on November 27, 1978, a hearing 
was held in chambers in which the prosecution made a Motion 
in Limine, asking the Court to instruct defense counsel not 
-11-
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to go into prior sexual matters of the victim (T.3,R.30). 
The reason for the motion was to prevent defense counsel 
from asking questions of the victim such as those asked 
at the preliminary hearing. Defense counsel apparently 
asked such questions of the prosecutrix as: "Does she 
(prosecutrix) like to make comparisons with other men;" 
and "did she like to have sex during her period." Another 
question asked of the victim by defense counsel at the 
preliminary hearing referred to a threat that the defendant 
said that he was "going to perform male sex on her and asked 
her if she had done that with other people before" (T.3). 
The trial judge granted the Motion in Limine, 
stating that it was the Court's opinion that defense counsel 
was entitled to go into the prosecutrix's predisposition 
as to general reputation, but was not entitled to ask about 
any specific sexual acts (T.S) (see Statement of Facts, 
Respondent's Brief). The Court subsequently modified its 
order granting the Motion in Limine regarding the sodomy 
charge, allowing defense counsel to ask the victim about any 
sexual preferences she might have regarding whether she 
consented (T.6). 
Appellant contends on appeal that the trial 
court committed reversible error in granting the Motion in 
Limine, thereby denying the appellant his opportunity to 
provide evidence as to the prosecutrix's reputation for 
sexual permissiveness and immoral character; evidence as 
-12-
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to witnesses' opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual 
permissiveness and immoral characteri evidence as to 
the appellant's opinion of the prosecutrix's sexual 
permissiveness and immoral character based upon alleged 
representations made to him by the prosecutrix; 
evidence as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits and 
customs; and evidence of specific instances of behavior 
which establish the prosecutrix's sexual habits and 
customs. Such evidence is alleged by the appellant to 
have been critical to the issues of the prosecutrix's 
alleged consent and the appellant's alleged lack of 
criminal intent as to all counts of his criminal conduct. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that the focal 
point of the present case is the issue of consent. 
Respondent submits that scrutiny of the facts as reflected 
in the record and adherence to existing case law as set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court reveal that the trial court 
was correct in granting the prosecution's Motion in Limine. 
Furthermore, the questions asked of the appellant and his 
witness by appellant's counsel concerning the prosecutrix's 
reputation for sexual morality were unable to be answered 
due to a lack of knowledge in one case and an unwillingness 
on the part of a defense witness in the other case. 
Prior to a discussion of the applicable case and 
statutory law, a review of some pertinent facts is necessary. 
-13-
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During the trial, the prosecutrix was asked on cross-
examination several questions by appellant's counsel 
concerning her sexual desires and preferences regarding 
men in general as well as the appellant: 
Q. (Defense counsel) : At this 
point in time, how long had you been 
divorced from Danny (prosecutrix's ex-
husband)? 
A. (Prosecutrix) : . • Two 
years. • • We was thinking about getting 
back together, maybe getting married 
again. (T. 42). 
* * * Q. (Defense counsel) : Were there 
problems in that reconciliation in that you 
had interest in other men? (Emphasis added.) 
A. (Prosecutrix): No. (T. 43). 
(Emphasis added.) 
* * * Q. (Defense counsel) : You found 
Steve (appellant) attractive; didn't you? 
A. (Prosecutrix): I did not. (T. 43). 
* * * 
Q. (Defense counsel) : ~/hen you find 
a nice looking man, do you say in your head 
to yourself that: "I find this man attractive?" 
A. (Prosecutrix) : Oh, maybe sometimes. 
Q. (Defense counsel) : And do you also 
say: "I maybe would like to get it on with 
this man, or have sex with this person?" 
(Emphasis added.) 
A. (Prosecutrix): No, I don't. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Q. (Defense counsel): You don't do that? 
A. (Prosecutrix): (Indicating negatively)· 
The Court: What was your answer? 
The Witness: No. (Emphasis added.) 
Q. (Defense counsel) : When you see an 
attractive man, do you say: "This is an attractiv 
man and I would like to have intercourse with hm? 
A. (Prosecutrix): When I see an attracti\'E 
man, I look at his hair and then I comment: "He's 
got nice hair or he's nice lookincr." I have no 
feelings about sexual emotions wi~h them. (T.43-' 
(Emphasis added.) 
-14-
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* * * Q. (Defense counsel) : You say this 
sexual intercouse went on for hours. 
How many hours--how many hours? 
A. (Prosecutrix) : • a long time. 
Q. (Defense counsel): You enjoyed 
it, didn't you? 
A. (Prosecutrix): No, I didn't. It 
hurt me. I was bruised. He wasn't trying 
to be nice about it. • • 
Q. (Defense counsel) : Is that 
what offended you? 
A. (Prosecutrix): No. He scared me, 
because I felt like he was going to take my 
life. 
Q. (Defense counsel) : You made no 
effort to resist, Gloria; isn't that correct? 
A. (Prosecutrix): Would you with a knife 
that was at your throat? (T.56). 
* * * Q. (Defense counsel) : To go down on him and 
have a penis of a man in your mouth was nothing 
to you; isn't that correct? (Emphasis added.) 
rtr. Boutwell (prosecuting attorney): Your 
Honor, I object. 
Ms. Taylor (defense counsel): I'm not making 
reference to any specific prior act, your Honor. 
The Court: All right. The objection is 
overruled. Can you answer that? 
The Witness (prosecutrix): Yes, I have done 
it before. (Emphasis added.) 
Q. (Defense counsel): It was not new to 
you? (Emphasis added.) 
A. (Prosecutrix): No. But only with my 
husband. (Emphasis added.) (T.60). 
* * * Q. (Defense Counsel) : That you were on your 
period was not ... That you're on your period is 
not necessarily a reason not to have sex; is it? 
(Emphasis added.) 
A. (Prosecutrix): I usually don't like sex 
on my period. I don't do that. (Emphasis added.) 
Q. (Defense counsel): Usually? 
A. (Prosecutrix) : Most of the time I won't. 
I don't like it. (T. 66). (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly it can be seen that from the above colloquy, 
appellant's counsel was allowed a wide range of latitude 
in the cross-examination of the victim regarding her sexual 
-15-
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habits as well as attitudes about men in general or the 
appellant. As will be shortly discussed, Utah case law 
prohibits cross-examination into prior specific acts, 
with the exception of a few qualified instances n0t 
applicable in the present case. 
The following testimony was elicited from 
Joyce Johnson, the girlfriend of appellant: 
Q. (Defense counsel) : Had you known 
her (prosecutrix) and known of her to the 
point where you would be able to make a 
statement with regard to her reputation in 
the community with regard to sexual behabior? 
* * * 
The witness (Joyce Johnson): Yes. 
Q. (Defense counsel) : And would you 
state for the jury to your knowledge the 
reputation that she does have in the 
community with regards to this? 
Mr. Boutwell (prosecuting attorney): 
I'm going to object. There's no foundation 
and it's improper phrasing of the question. 
The Court: I think we have to limit it, 
of course, to the general reputation of as to 
chastity and sexual morality, as I recall--
are the phrases that are used. So if you want 
to rephrase your question in that regard. 
Q. (Defense counsel) : Would you make a 
statement with regard to chastity or her morality? 
The Court: Sexual morality. 
Ms. Taylor (defense counsel) : Sexual 
morality. 
Mr. Boutwell (prosecuting attorney): Again, 
we're talking about knowing her socially, but not , 
1 
on the job--or for a while. The phrasing isn't ng:.: 
'Do you know her now socially, what's her reputatio<' 
I don't think there's any foundation. That's my 
objection. 
The Court: All right. The objection is 
overruled. You may answer. 
Mr. Boutv.•ell (prosecuting attorney) : ~lay I 
voir dire the witness out of the presence of the 
jury before she ~akes her answer? 
The Court: No. I think we'll leave 1t to 
cross-ex~inatio:-~. l\'e :"eel there's enough 
-16- + 
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foundation. I believe she can give her 
opinion as to these items. 
Q. (Defense counsel): You do have an 
opinion? 
A. (Joyce Johnson): Yes. 
The Court: As to general reputation 
we're talking about. 
Q. (Defense counsel): We realize it 
is your opinion and it is you+ own. Will you 
tell the jury what that is, please? 
A. (Joyce Johnson): I'd rather not. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Boutwell: Your Honor, she asked for 
her opinion. That is objectionable. . • 
The Court: Of course, that is objectionable. 
We can't let her give her own opinion relative 
to general reputation. 
Mr. Boutwell: She's got to give the 
opinion of society, not her opinion. 
The Witness (Joyce Johnson): I don't know 
what the opinion of society is. (T.l27-129). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The testimony of Ms. Johnson refutes appellant's allegation 
that he was unable to examine witnesses as to the prosecutrix's 
reputation for sexual permissiveness and ~oral character. 
Ms. Johnson did not know what the opinion of society to be. 
She was prohibited from giving her own opinion regarding the 
prosecutrix's reputation for sexual permissiveness and immoral 
character because of the operation of Rules 46 and 47 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 2 as well as the case of State v. 
2 Rule 46, Utah Rules of Evidence, states in full: When a 
peron's character or trait of his character is in issue, it 
may be proved by testimony in the form of opinion, evidence 
of reputation; or evidence of specific instances of the 
person's conduct, subject, however, to the limitations of 
Rules 47 and 48." (Emphasis added.) Rule 47, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, states in relevant part: "Subject to Rule 48, when 
a trait of a person's character is relevant as tending to prove 
his conduct on a specified occasion, such trait may be proved 
in the same manner as provided by Rule 46, except that (a) 
evidence of specific instances of conduct other than evidence 
of convictlon of a crirrte which tends to prove the trait tQ be 
bad shall be inadmissible. (Emphasis added.) 
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Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1288, 1291 (1978), wherein this 
court stated in that case of forcible sexual abuse: 
Further, the accepted procedure in 
eliciting testimony of one's reputation as it 
pertains to his character or a trait of.his 
character that is in issue is to first qualify 
the witness by determining if he is acquainted 
with the reputation of the person in question, 
and if so, then to have him relate what that 
reputation is. However appropriate it may be 
to prove a character trait in issue by 
testimony in the form of an opinion (the 
Court here cites Rule 46, Utah Rules of 
Evidence), it is not a~ropriate to elicit 
from the witness his in ividual opinion as 
to what the erson's reputation is in re ard 
thereto. (Emphasis added. 
The Court explained, referring to testimony from a defendant: 
Bare, unproven allegations or "complaints" 
of prior incidents of similar conduct have no 
relevancy to the issue of defendant's truth-
fulness or veracity. The admission of such 
evidence without further explanation could only 
have caused the jury to speculate about 
defendant's propensities to commit such crimes 
and confuse the issues .. 
578 P.2d at 1290. 
This Court should apply the same reasoning to a 
personal opinion regarding the sexual permissiveness and 
immoral character of the victim of a rape as was attempted 
to be elicited from a defendant-witness. Joyce Johnson's 
opinion of the victim's reputation was correctly limited 
because she did not know what the community's opinion was. 
The record also reflects that the appellant had 
no basis for knowing the prosecutrix's reputation for 
sexual permissiveness or immoral characLer. The appellant 
-18- ___,., 
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had not been in Utah very long, having just come from 
California (T.l36). He did not have the opportunity to 
ascertain any opinions which the community may have had 
regarding the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual 
permissiveness or immoral character. He certainly would 
not have any information or representation furnished by the 
prosecutrix regarding her reputation, habits and customs, 
or sexual preferences due to the fact that he met her for 
the first time the night of the rape (T.20,138). Further-
more, the record reveals that there was no conversation 
between appellant and the prosecutrix regarding her 
reputation for sexual permissiveness and immoral character, 
her sexual habits and customs (if there in fact were any), 3 
or sexual preferences. Thus, he had no foundation or basis 
for either knowing of the prosecutrix's reputation for 
sexual permissiveness and immoral character (again, if in 
fact there was one, and the record reveals no evidence 
whatsoever of any), or for forming any opinion as to her 
reputation, habits and customs, preferences, etc. Finally, 
any opinion which Joyce Johnson had regarding the prosecutrix's 
reputation, habits and customs, or preferences which may 
have been communicated to the appellant would be 
inadmissible via the testimony of appellant because of 
violation of the heresay rule. It is also noteworthy 
3 Respondent submits that most all members of the human race of 
~he age of puberty and beyond have some sexual habits and 
customs, as well as sexual preferences. 
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that Ms. Johnson testified that she did not know the 
reputation in the community regarding the prosecutrix's 
sexual morality, thus any testimony proffered by appellant 
based on statements by Ms. Johnson regarding such·would 
also be inadmissible. 
Respondent thus submits that appellant was not 
thwarted in his cross-examination of the prosecutrix nor 
in the examination of any witnesses, including Ms. Johnson. 
There was no factual basis to form a foundation for most 
of the questions he wanted to ask. Those questions which 
were allowed were answered by Ms. Johnson and the 
prosecutrix, perhaps the answers not being to the liking 
of the appellant, but nonetheless, they were answered. 
The credibility of these answers, of course, was exclusively 
the prerogative of the jury, State v. Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 
310 P. 2d 388 (1957), and on appeal from a criminal conviction, 
this Court is obliged to accept that version of the evidence 
which supports the verdict, which in the case at bar, was 
guilty on all three counts. State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 
498 P.2d 357 (1972); State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 
(1975). 
Case and statutory law in Utah as well as in the 
overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions support 
respondent's view that the trial judge was correct in grant: 
-20-
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the prosecution's Motion in Limine regarding the 
prosecutrix's specific conduct on prior occasions with 
any one man. 
In Utah, the law regarding interrogation of 
a rape victim was originally stated by this Court in 
State v. Scott, 55 Utah 553, 188 Pac. 860 (1920): 
Where the defendant admits the sexual 
act, but contends that the prosecutrix 
consented thereto, and where, as here, she 
is of lawful age, such evidence (general 
reputation for chastity or prosecutrix) is 
relevant and material upon the question of 
consent. 
188 Pac. 864. 
[However], the authorities are very 
numerous, indeed the great weight of 
authority is to the effect, that the 
prosecutrix cannot be interrogated on 
cross-examination as to whether she had 
had sexual intercouse with others than the 
defendant. The doctrine is based upon the 
fact, and the great weight of authority is 
to the effect, that specific acts of inter-
course with others than the defendant may 
not be shown. If it is desired to prove 
that the prosecutrix ~s a lewd woman, that 
may only be done by attack~ng her general 
reputation for chastity and morality, and not 
by showing specific acts of wrongdoing .. 
188 P.2d 865 (emphasis added). 
This Court reaffirmed the Scott principle in State v. Smith, 
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936), further explaining its 
logic for excluding testimony concerning a rape victim's prior 
isolated acts of intercouse with men other than the defendant. 
-21-
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In cases of rape where the prosecutrix 
is over the age of consent, her bad reputa-
tion for chastity is a proper matter for 
consideration of the jury as affecting her 
credibility and bearing on the probability 
of consent. State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 
51 Pac. 818; 1 Wharton's Crim. Evid. 481 •• 
In some jurisdictions the courts hold that 
the prosecuting witness may be examined as 
to previous acts of immorality on her part 
as affecting her credibility as a witness 
[cites omitted]. There are grounds for 
distinction between examination of a 
prosecutrix as to prev~ous conduct showing 
her to be a common prostitute and merely 
as to isolated acts of intercourse. The former 
conduct would indicate a low state of morals and 
affect cred~bil~ty as a w~tness, while isolated 
acts might have no such bearing. [cite omitted.] 
62 P. 2d 1113. 
The latest sex abuse case in Utah involving the issue 
of consent and the scope of cross-examination to be permitted i: 
that of State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975), which 
appellant cites in support of his argument. In Howard, the 
defendant picked up the prosecutrix alongside the highway, 
asking her if she would like to go for a ride. She accepted 
and they drove southward for about two hours, where the 
defendant turned off the main highway, driving over a hill 
and parking his truck. At this point the prosecutrix claimed 
that the defendant seized an ice pick, placed it at her 
throat, threatened her, dragged her from the truck and 
threw her to the ground, raping her. The defendant claimed 
that he and the prosecutrix engaged in petting and 
preliminaries, followed by consensual intercourse. The 
parties then got back in the truck and returned to Ephraim, 
-) /--
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stopping on the way in Manti to use the restroom. When 
arriving in Ephraim at her cousins, the prosecutrix called 
her parents, telling them of the attack. She also reported 
the incident to a male friend, who accompanied her to the 
sheriff, where she gave the information.upon which the 
defendant was arrested and charged. 
This Court, after noting some inconsistencies in 
the prosecutrix's story as well as taking into account the 
trial court's sustaining of the prosecuting attorney's 
objection to testimony about the reputation of the 
prosecutrix in the locality, 4 vacated the conviction 
and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court was 
clearly correct in its ruling, for the law prior to and 
after Howard is that the reputation of the prosecutrix in 
the community for chastity is a proper matter for considera-
tion of the jury as affecting her credibility and bearing 
on the issue of consent. State v. Smith, supra; State v. 
Scott, supra; Rules 46, 47, Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
trial judge in the Howard case should have permitted the 
defendant's witness to testify about the prosecutrix's 
reputation in the locality for moral character because 
the witness testified that he knew what the reputation was. 
4 The witness stated that he knew the reputation of the 
prosecutrix in the locality as to moral character. The 
court, after objection by the prosecution, refused to 
let the witness testify as to what that reputation was. 
-23-
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In contrast is the present case, where the appellant's 
witness, Joyce Johnson, testified that she did not 
know what the prosecutrix's reputation in the community 
for sexual morality was (T.l27-129). FurthermoreJ the 
appellant in the present case was never asked that question 
either on direct or cross-examiantion. As previously 
discussed, appellant would not have possessed the knowledge 
to answer such a question as he had only just recently 
arrived in Utah from California (T.l36), was not even 
living in the same community as the prosecutrix (she lived 
in \'iellington, the appellant was staying in Helper at 
his sister's home (T.l9,121)), and could not have received 
information from Joyce Johnson regarding the prosecutrix's 
reputation since she (Joyce Johnson) stated that prior to 
the night of the rape, she had not seen the appellant in 
4 or 5 months (T.ll9,121). Thus, appellant would not have 
had the opportunity to learn of the prosecutrix's reputa-
tion for sexual morality in her locality of Wellington. 
Respondent submits, therefore, that appellant's 
allegation that he was denied the opportunity to provide 
evidence of the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual 
permissiveness and immoral character as well as evidence 
of witnesses' opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual 
permissiveness and i~~oral character are not well founded. 
-2~-
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The appellant was never asked such a question, and if 
he had, would have been unable to provide an answer as he 
had no opportunity to know what society's opinion may 
have been. The appellant's witness (Joyce Johnson) was 
asked about society's opinion of the prosecutrix's 
reputation for sexual morality, to which she answered 
that she did not know (T.l27-129). Neither the appellant 
nor his witness could have testified as to their personal 
opinion of the prosecutrix's reputation in the community 
for sexual morality. State v. Goodliffe, supra, at 
578 P.2d 1291. 
Appellant further argues that the trial court 
should have permitted him to provide evidence as to his 
opinion of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and 
immoral character based upon alleged representations made 
to him by the prosecutrix. As previously discussed in 
State v. Goodliffe, supra, the Utah Supreme Court has 
declared that "it is not appropriate to elicit from the 
witness his individual opinion as to what the person's 
reputation is in regard thereto." The Court makes this 
statement without qualifications or limitations, except 
to reinforce the validity of the declaration by stating 
such to be the law, "However appropriate it may be to 
prove a character trait in issue by testimony in the form 
of opinion." The Court has not made exceptions such as 
-25-
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appellant urges here, i.e., for the appellant's opinion 
evidence to be admitted because it is allegedly "based 
upon representations made to him by the prosecutrix." 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record of any 
conversation between the prosecutrix and appellant 
regarding any alleged representations by the prosecutrix 
regarding her alleged sexual permissiveness or immoral 
character. Rule 56 (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
If the witness is not testifying as 
an expert his testimony in the form of 
opinion or inferences is limited to such 
opinions or inferences as the judge finds 
(a) may be rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness and (b) are helpful 
to a clear understanding of his testimony 
or to the determination of the fact in 
issue. 
The trial judge obviously did not feel that any such 
testimony by the appellant regarding his opinion of the 
prosecutrix's alleged sexual permissiveness and immoral 
character based upon her alleged representations met the 
criteria in subsections (a) or (b) in Rule 56(1). Such 
a decision to preclude such testimony by the appellant 
is also supported by Rules 46 and 47 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, as Rule 46 allows testimony concerning a 
person's character or trait (when it is in issue) in the 
form of opinion, subject however, to Rule 4~, which 
prohibits evidence of specific conduct other than evidence 
of conviction of a crL~e. Thus appellant's argunent 
claiming he 1\aS preven':ed from :::_n':roducinc evidence as 
_"'),..._ 
---
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to his opinion of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual 
permissiveness and immoral character based upon·alleged 
representations which she made to him is not well founded 
based upon the record or legal authority. 
Appellant's final allegation +egards the 
trial court's limitation on the evidence appellant wished 
to offer as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs 
as well as evidence of specific instances of behavior which 
establish the prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs. 
Appellant cites Rules 49 and 50 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence in support of his claim that evidence of the 
prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs should have been 
admitted. Those rules read respectively: 
Evidence of habit or custom is relevant 
to an issue of behavior on a specified 
occasion, but is admissible on that issue 
only as tending to prove that the behavior 
on such occasion conformed to the habit or 
custom. Rule 49. 
Testimony in the form of opinion is 
admissible on the issue of habit or custom. 
Evidence of specific instances of behavior 
is admissible to prove habit or custom if the 
evidence is of a sufficient number of such 
instances to warrant a finding of such habit 
or custom. Rule SO. 
Respondent submits a two-fold argument. First that Rule 
49 is modified by Rule 50 in that Rule 50 states there must 
be evidence of a sufficient number of instances of behavior 
before evidence of such instances of behavior can be 
admitted for the purpose of showing that the specified 
-27-
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instance of behavior in question conformed to a habit or 
custom. The record in this case nowhere reflects that 
appellant knew of a sufficient number of instances of 
sexual behavior regarding the prosecutrix in order to 
warrant a finding of any sexual habits or customs. He 
had met the prosecutrix for the first time the night he 
raped her. He had only been in Utah a short time, having 
come in from California, and he was not even living in the 
same locality as the prosecutrix. Thus, he had no basis 
for any first-hand knowledge concerning the prosecutrix's 
sexual habits or customs. Secondly, respondent submits 
that even if the prosecutrix did have some sexual habits 
and customs, their admission would have been irrelevant. 
The evidence conclusively demonstrated that the prosecutrix 
was forced to have intercourse with the appellant at the 
threat of a knife at her throat. She was also forced to 
commit sodomy--pursuant to the same threat. She had 
physical evidence of bruises on her body, specifically her 
nipples on her breasts were bleeding from being pinched, her 
vagina was bruised, and she had scars on her neck (T.l2, 
40,82,93,101-104,110). She also had a cut on her throat 
from the appellant's knife (T.24,25). Certainly, even 
if her sexual habit was to have intercourse with other 
men, this did not give the appellant the right to forcibly 
rape her and force her to cormni t sodomy as v:ell as l:idnap 
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her. As this Court stated in State v. Howard, supra, at 
544 P.2d 469: 
It is not to be questioned that the 
fact that a woman may be of bad reputation, 
or that she may be known to be immoral or 
even completely dissolute of character does 
not give anyone license to forcibly violate 
her. 
The proscription of Howard would be the case in the present 
situation even if there was evidence of bad sexual habits 
or reputation on the part of the prosecutrix. But there 
is no such evidence. The facts are that the appellant 
admitted to all of the essential elements of the crimes of 
forcible rape and sodomy. He asserts the defense of consent, 
yet the record indicates that he knew that what he was 
forcing the prosecutrix to do was against her will (see 
Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts, supra). Thus, 
appellant's insistence on being allowed to introduce 
evidence as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits and 
customs is not well founded. 
The denial by the trial judge of appellant's 
request to introduce evidence of specific instances of 
behavior which would allegedly establish the prosecutrix's 
sexual habits and customs was correct and case law clearly 
refutes appellant's contention. Appellant cites State v. 
Howard, supra, as authority in support of his proposition, 
as well as Rules 49 and 50 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
-29-
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The applicable portion of the Court's opinion in Howard 
is as follows: 
• • • though it is not proper to 
permit inquiry into specific acts of prior 
misconduct of the victim, where the critical 
issue is consent, and the circumstances are 
such that it reasonably appears that evidence 
concerning her moral character would have 
sufficient probative value to outweigh any 
detrimental aspects of admitting such 
testimony, it should be admitted. 
544 P.2d at 469. 
Assuming arguendo that the last phrase in the above quoted 
Court's opinion "it should be admitted" refers to specific 
acts of prior misconduct of the victim, respondent must 
point out that appellant has ignored two important factors: 
(1) two conditions precedent to the admission of testimony 
regarding specific acts of prior misconduct; (2) subsequent 
case law to the Howard case rejecting appellant's argument. 
The two conditions precedent to the admission 
of specific acts of prior misconduct are: (1) the critical 
issue must be consent (as it is in the present case); (2) 
"the circumstances must be such that it reasonbly appears 
the evidence concerning [the prosecutrix's] moral character 
would have sufficient probative value to outweigh any 
detrimental aspects of admitting such testimony." Such a 
determination is of course within the discretion of the 
trial judge, and this Court has declared that the trial 
court will be reversed only if he abuses that discretion, 
-30-
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or if the exclusion of such evidence regarding specific 
acts of the prosecutrix would probably have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different 
verdict. State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017 
(1978). Rule 45 and Rule 5, Utah Rules.of Evidence. 5 
Respondent submits that allowing evidence concerning 
the prosecutrix's specific prior acts would not have 
had sufficient probative value to outweigh any detrimental 
5 Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
Except as in these rules otherwise 
provided, the judge may in his discretion 
exclude evidence that its admission will 
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time, 
or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice or of confusing the issues or of 
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and 
harmfully surprise a party who has not had 
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that 
such evidence would be offered. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) 
it appears of record that the proponent of the 
evidence either made known the substance of the 
evidence in a form and by a method approved by 
the judge, or indicated the substance of the 
expected evidence by questions indicating the 
desired answers, and (b) the court which passes 
upon the effect of the error or errors is of the 
opinion that the excluded evidence would probably 
have had a substantial influence in bringing about 
a different verdict or finding. 
-31-
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aspects of admitting such testimony. Such admission would 
only have created undue prejudice towards the prosecutrix, 
for the real issue was whether she consented on this 
particular occasion, not what she may have or not·have 
done with some other man on a prior occasion. The jury 
could easily have been confused and misled as to the 
real issues, thereby "trying" the prosecutrix instead 
of the appellant. 
Respondent also notes that appellant did not 
substantially comply with subsection (a) of Rule 5 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, whereby the proponent of the evidence 
either makes known the substance of the evidence to be offered 
in a form approved by the judge or indicates the substance of 
the expected evidence by questions indicating the desired 
answers. Such a procedure was not followed by the appellant. 
Appellant has given the Court no evidence in the record 
that he knew of any prior misconducts on the part of 
the prosecutrix. Thus, even if arguendo, the evidence 
was erroneously excluded, the verdict would not be reversed 
due to noncompliance with subsection (a) of Rule 5 and 
also due to the fact that the excluded evidence would not 
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
-32-
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different verdict as prescribed in subsection (b) of 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The case law in Utah since the Howard case 
has been directly contrary to appellant~s argument 
for admission of evidence of the prosecutrix's 
prior specific acts of misconduct (if there were 
any). In State v. Starks, supra, during the cross-
examination of a witness, counsel attempted to 
show misconduct on the part of the witness at an 
earlier time in order to attack his credibility. 
Rejecting the proffered testimony, the Court, 
relying upon Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 22 
and 47, stated: 
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••• "it is clear that only 
previous convictions, and not previous 
acts of misconduct which do not result 
in conviction, may be used to impeach a 
witness' credibility." 
581 P.2d at 1017. The Court further stated its reasoning: 
In the instant matter, the proffered 
testimony would not have any relevance 
to the question of guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. 
581 P.2d at 1017. Similarly, in State v. Minnish, Utah, 
560 P.2d 340, 341 (1977), this Court stated: 
. Rule 47 (U.R.E.) definitely 
requires reiection of evidence of 
specific behavior to prove a character 
trait except evidence of conviction of 
a crime. 
Even though appellant urges that the evidence of 
the prosecutrix's prior specific acts (he has made no 
such proffer of such evidence) is critical to the issue of 
consent, respondent submits that specific acts go to the 
credibility of the witness, and thus the ruling in State v. 
Starks, supra, would apply as well as Rule 46 and 47 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Therefore, evidence of prior 
S?ecific acts for purposes of impeachment would be in-
admissible unless such acts resulted in conviction. 
In appellant's brief, he has argued that a 
number of other jurisdictions have adopteci. positions 
similar to that contended for b~ appellant, and he cites 
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various authorities. The cases cited by appellant 
involving the jurisdictions of Kentucky and Texas have 
modified by later enactment of statutes. 6 Similarly, other 
cases cited by the appellant involving the jurisdictions 
of Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Virginia 
were misinterpreted by appellant as being supportive of 
his argument, whereas they are in fact not (see Appellant's 
Brief, p. 9 for specific cites of those cases). The ruling 
in the case cited by appellant involving the District of 
7 Columbia was later changed by a subsequent case. 
As an example, appellant cites the case of ~ 
v. Herrera, 582 P.2d 384 (N.M. 1978), as being supportive of 
his argument. A close look reveals just the opposite. In 
that case, the defendant was charged with, among other 
things, criminal sexual penetration. He was convicted and 
appealed, claiming among other things, that the trial court 
erred in prohibiting questioning of the victim concerning 
past sexual conduct. He asserted that this prohibition 
6 Kentucky: 1976, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.145; Texas: 
1979, Tex. Penal Code § 21.13. 
7 1977, McLean v. United States, D.C. et. App., 377 
All. 2d 74, wherein it was held that evidence of a 
victim's crior sexual relations with others and of 
her reputation for unchastity are not admissible on 
the issue of consent or for purpose of impeachment. 
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limited his constitutional right to confront witnesses ag~inst 
him. The appellant in that case also attacked the con-
stitutionality of a procedural statute involved, which 
read as follows: 
40A-9-26. Testimony--Limitations--
In camera hearing--A. As a matter of 
substantive right, in prosecutions under 
sections 2 through 6 of this act [40A-9-21 
to 40A-9-25 (sexual crimes)], evidence of 
the victim's past sexual conduct, opinion 
evidence thereof, or of reputation for 
past sexual conduct, shall not be admitted 
unless, and only to the extent that the 
court finds, that evidence of the victim's 
past sexual conduct is material to the 
case and that its inflammatory or 
prejudicial nature does not outweigh its 
probative value. 
B. If such evidence is proposed 
to be offered, the defendant must file 
a written motion prior to trial. The 
court shall hear such pretrial motion 
prior to trial at an in camera hearing 
to determine whether such evidence is 
admissible under subsection A of this 
section . . if such proposed evidence is 
deemed admissible, the court shall issue 
a written order stating what evidence 
may be introduced by the defendant and 
stating the specific questions to be 
permitted. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court held the statute constitutional, 
and further upheld the decision of the trial court, 
affirming the conviction of the defendant: 
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in our opinion • • • past 
sexual conduct, in itself, indicates 
nothing concerning consent in a particular 
case. This is a starting point because 
relevancy is not an inherent characteristic 
of any item of evidence, but exists only 
as a relation between an item of evidence 
and a matter properly provable in the 
case. [Cite omitted.] 
If defendant claims a victim's past 
sexual conduct is relevant to the issue 
of the victim's consent, it is up to the 
defendant to make a preliminary showing 
which indicates relevancy ••• The 
question of relevancy is not raised 
by asserting that it exists, there must 
be a showing of a reasonable basis for 
believing that past sexual conduct is 
pertinent to the consent issue. [Cite 
omitted.] 
* * * Absent a showing sufficient to 
raise an issue as to relevancy, questions 
concerning past sexual conduct are to be 
excluded. 
582 P.2d at 393. 
Respondent takes the time to examine the Herrera 
case for two reasons. One, is that the case certainly 
does not support, as appellant contends in his brief, the 
proposition urged on this Court that evidence of prior 
particular acts of unchastity or other sexual misconduct 
are admissible on the issue of consent. Neither the Herrera 
case nor the statute in question there held such a 
proposition. The New Mexico Court found them to be 
inadmissible unless a showing of relevancy could be made. 
Second, the trial judge in the present case followed the 
rules set forth in the Herrera case. He held a hearing 
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in his chambers prior to trial and determined that 
inquiries about past sexual acts with specific men 
were not relevant to the issue of consent. 
Even though Utah does not have a statute similar 
to the one in question in the Herrera c~se, respondent 
submits that this Court's holding in Howard (whereby it 
was said that where consent is in issue and where 
"circumstances are such that it reasonably appears that 
evidence concerning [the prosecutrix's] moral character 
would have sufficient probative value to outweigh any 
detrimental effects of admitting such testimony it should 
be admitted), is in essence the same as the substantive 
portion of the New Mexico statute, i.e., are the prior 
specific sexual acts relevant to the issue of consent? 
If so, they are to be admitted. The trial judge in 
the present case, as well as the judge in the Herrera case, 
found in the exercise of their discretion, such prior 
specific sexual acts not to be relevant to the issue of 
consent. 
Most states are in agreement with Utah law 
either by case law or statutory law that prior acts 
of the prosecutrix are inadmissible on the issue of 
consent or to impeach credibility unless a showing of 
relevancy prior to trial can be made by the 
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8 defendant. 
Respondent submits that the trial judge was 
8 See State v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 580 P.2d 1341 (1978)1 
State v. Blum, 17 Wash.App. 37, 561 P.2d 226 (1977)i 
State v. Ar1zona ex rel. Pope v. Superior court, In and 
For County of Mojave, 113 Ariz. 22, S45 P.2d 946 (1976). 
States with statutes limiting admissibility of prior sexual 
acts without a showing of relevancy are: 
Alabama: 1977, Ala.Code § 12-21-203. 
Alaska: 1975, Alas. Stat. § 12.45.045. 
Arkansas:l977, Ark. Stat. § 41-1810.0. 
Calif.: 1974, Calif. Evid. Code SS 782, 1103. 
Colo.: 1975, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-407. 
Del.: 1974, Del. Code tit. 11 SS 3508-3509. 
Florida: 1974, Fla. Stat. Ann. S 794.022. 
Georgia: 1976, Ga. Code Ann. § 38-202.1. 
Hawaii: 1977, Hawaii Rev. Stat. S 707-742. 
Idaho: 1977, Idaho Code§ 18-6105. 
Indiana: 1975, 1976, Burns Ind. Code Ann. S 35-1-32,5-1. 
Iowa: 1977, Iowa Rules of Crim. Proc, Rule 20. 
Kansas: K.S.A. 60-447a, Rules of Evidence,Rule 47a. 
Kentucky:l976, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.145. 
La.: 1975, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 15.498. 
Maryland:l976, Md. Ann. Code Art. 27 S 461. 
Mass.: 1977, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Chap. 233 S 21B. 
Michigan:l974, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j.-
Minn.: 1975, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609-347. 
Miss.: 1977, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-70. 
Missouri:l977, Mo.Ann. Stat. § 491.015. 
Nebraska:l975, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408-05. 
Nevada: 1971, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 48.069, 50.090. 
N.J.: 1976, N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:84A-32.l. 
N.M.: 1975, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-26. 
N.Y.: 1975, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law§ 60.42. 
N.C.: 1977, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-58.6. 
Ohio: 1975, Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 
2907.02, 2907.05. 
Okla.: 1975, Okla. Stat. Ann. § 22-750. 
Oregon: 1975, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 164-475. 
Pa.: 1976, Purdon's Cons. Penna. Stat. § 18-3104. 
R.I.: 1975, R.I. RulesofCrim. Proc., Superior 
Court, Rule 26.3. 
S.C.: 1977, S.C. Code§ 16-3-659.1. 
S.D.: 1975, S.D. Comp. Laws § 23-44-16.1. 
Texas: 1975, Tex. Penal Code § 21.13. 
I'<' ash. : 197 5, Wash. 'Rev. Code Ann. § 9. 7 9.150. 
\'I.V.: 1976, W.Va. Code§ 61-BB-12. 
\'lise.: 1975, Y.Jisc. Stat. Ann. § 972.11. 
Wyo.: 1977, Wyo. Stat. lilln. § 6-4-312. 
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acting within his discretion in limiting the evidence which 
appellant sought to produce regarding the witnesses' opinions 
of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual permissiveness and 
immoral character; evidence as to the appellant's opinion 
of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual permissiveness and 
immoral character base~ upon alleged representations made to 
the appellant by the prosecutrix; evidence as to the 
prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs; and evidence of 
specific instances of behavior which establish the 
prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs. In addition to 
the cases cited, Rules of Evidence and reasoning set forth 
therein, respondent calls the attention of the Court to 
Rule 22(c) (d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
encompasses all that has been argued: 
As affecting the credibility of 
a witness . (c) evidence of traits 
of his character other than truth, 
honesty, or integrity or their 
opposites, shall be inadmissible; 
(d) evidence of specific instances 
of his conduct relevant only as 
tending to prove a trait of his 
character, shall be inadmissible. 
The trial judge did not err in refusing appellant's 
line of examination and cross-examination. Should this 
Court hold otherwise, respondent submits that said exclusion 
was harmless and would have had no prejudicial effect on the 
verdict. Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL CQURT DID NOT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DEFINING THE SCOPE 
OF REPUTATION EVIDENCE INTO WHICH 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS ALLOWED TO 
DELVE IN HIS EXAMINATION OF HIS 
WITNESS. 
Appellant alleges that the trial court, in 
granting the prosecution's motion in limine, restricted 
appellant's examination of witnesses regarding the 
prosecutrix's reputation to her "general reputation in 
the community." He then alleges that the trial court, 
during the course of the trial, enlarged the scope of 
"general reputation," to include the prosecutrix's 
reputation as to "sexual morality," and then proceeded 
to define and limit the scope of reputation evidence so 
that the appellant was effectively denied the opportunity 
to examine the witness on any aspect of the prosecutrix's 
reputation. Appellant cites portions of the trial transcript 
(T. 127-129) in support of his argument. 
Respondent submits that the trial judge's 
limitation of the examination of Joyce Johnson (appellant's 
witness) by aopellant's counsel to her (witnesses') 
knowledge of the prosecutrix's general reputation in the 
community for sexual morality was' correct. Furthermore, 
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respondent submits that appellant's interpretation of the 
colloquy on pages 127-129 of the trial transcript is purely 
self-serving and at best, distorted. 
The law in Utah regarding the intent to which a 
witness may be examined regarding another's reputation is 
very clear, particularly_in cases involving forcible 
sex crimes. In State v. Scott, supra, at 188 P. 855, this 
Court stated: 
. . . If it is desired to 
prove that the prosecutrix is a 
lewd woman, that may only be done by 
attacking her general reputation for 
chastity and morality. 
Emphasis added. 
In State v. Smith, supra, at 62 P.2d 1113, this Court declared: 
In cases of rape where the 
prosecutrix is over the age of 
consent, her bad reputation for 
chastitv is a proper matter for 
consideration of the jury as affecting 
her credibility and bearing on the 
probab1ity of consent. 
Emphasis added. 
Similarly, in State v. Howard, supra, at 544 P.2d 470, this 
Honorable Court again stated: 
. the probative value of the 
victim's reputation as to moral character 
is sufficient to . . justify the admission 
of such evidence. 
Emphasis added. 
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Thus, it can be seen that in sexual abuse cases, the 
trial court must allow reputation evidence as to "general 
reputation for chastity and morality" (Sco·tt), "bad 
reputation for chastity" (Smith), or "reputation as ~o moral 
character" (Howard) , assuming of course that proper 
foundation is laid. 
The question to be answered now is whether the 
trial judge in the present case followed the law. The 
record reveals that he did. The record shows that the 
trial judge limited appellant's counsel's examination by 
his witness to "her reputation in the community as to 
chastity and sexual morality:" 
Q. (Defense counsel): Had you 
known her and known of her to the point 
where you would be able to make a 
statement with regard to her reputation 
in the community with regard to sexual 
behavior? 
* * * 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. (Defense counsel): And would you 
state for the jury your knowledge of the 
reoutation that she does have in the com-
mu~ity with regards to this (her sexual 
behavior)? 
* * * 
The Court: I think we have to limit 
it, of course, to the general reputation 
of as to chastity and sexual morality, as 
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I recall--are the phrases that are 
used. So if you want to rephrase 
yourquestion in that regard--
Q. (Defense Counsel) : Would you make 
a statement with regard to chastity or 
her morality? 
The Court: Sexual morality. 
Ms. Taylorl (Defense Counsel): 
Sexual morality. 
(Objection by the prosecution for 
lack of foundation) . 
The Court: No. I think we leave it 
to cross-examination. 1~e feel there's 
enough foundation. I believe she can 
give her opinion as to these items. 
Q. (Defense Counsel): You do have an 
opinion? 
A. Yes. 
The Court: As to general reputation we're 
talking about. [Note: it is here obvious 
the court is talking about general reputation 
in the community as to sexual morality]. 
Q. (Defense Counsel): We realize it is 
your opinion and it is your own. Kill you 
tell the jury what that is, please? 
A. I'd rather not. 
Mr. Boutwell (Prosecutor): 
she asked for her own opinion. 
objectionable--
Your Honor, 
That is 
The Court: Of course, that is 
objectionable. We can't let her give 
her own opinion relative to general 
opinion. (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Boutwell: She's got to give 
the opinion of society, not her 
opinion. 
The Witness: r don't know what 
the opinion of society 1s. (Emphas1s added) • 
(Objection by prosecutor to 
strike anything she has previou&ly-
said regarding her personal opinion 
or the opinion of society). 
The Court: The objection will have 
to be sustained, if she doesn't know 
what society's opinion is ..• 
T. 127-129. 
It is obvious from the above that the court 
throughout the dialogue is referring to the general reputation 
of the prosecutrix in the commumity for chastity and 
sexual morality (T. 127-128). When the court sustains the 
prosecutrix's objection to the witness testifying to 
anything other than the opinion of society, the court was 
referring to the opinion of the community (local society) 
not society at large or society as a whole, as appellant 
contends. Furthermore, the witness most certainly could not 
have given her own personal opinion as to either what she 
believed the reputation of the prosecutrix to be or what her 
personal opinion was regarding the reputation of the prosecutrix 
to be among the community (reputation refers to reputation 
for chastity and sexual morality). State v. Goodlife, supra, 
-4 5-
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578 P.2d at 1291. Had the witness stated that she knew 
what the reputation of the prosecutrix for sexual morality 
to be among the community (society),she could have 
testified as to that. As it was, the witness stated that 
she did !!£! know "what the opinion of society" was 
(T. 129). Appellant attempts to show that his witness 
was "misguided" as to the use of the word "society," claiming 
that the witness thought the court was referring to 
society as a whole as opposed to the local community. 
Respondent submits that the trial court was 
correct in limiting the appellant's examination into 
reputation evidence. The witness, as she responded at the 
trial, testified that she had an opinion (T. 128), 
regarding the reputation of the prosecutrix for sexual 
morality (respondent submits that she was referring to 
her own personal opinion), but answered in the negative 
when asked whether she had an opinion as to the p·rosecutrix 's 
reputation for sexual morality in the community. Thus, 
no reversible error was committed by the trial court in 
limiting the examination of the >vitness to her knowledge of 
the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual morality in the 
community. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST AND SECOND 
RULINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE PERMISSIBLE 
SCOPE OF EXAMINATION CONCERNING THE 
PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL MORALITY WERE NOT 
INCONSISTENT, CAPRICIOUS OR INHERENTLY 
UNJUST. 
Appellant misconstrues and misinterprets the ruling 
of the trial judge when he alleges in Point III that the 
court erred in allowing the appellant to examine the 
prosecutrix as to any sexual preference she may have had 
regarding the charge of sodomy. The court, originally ruling 
favorably on the prosecution's motion in limine by 
stating that appellant's counsel could "go into her 
(prosecutrix's) predisposition as to general reputation 
(for sexual morality and chastity)," subsequently modified 
that ruling by allowing appellant's counsel to ask the 
prosecutrix as to any sexual preference she might have 
regarding sodomy. The trial court obviously felt that this 
may have some bearing on the issue of consent relative to 
the sodomy charge (T. 6). Appellant does not argue with 
the later ruling, but submits that the trial court should 
have also allowed examination of the prosecutrix regarding 
any sexual preference she may have had regarding sexual 
intercourse. The reason for the trial court's ruling and 
distinction is obvious. Respondent submits that the court 
could almost take judicial notice that most all members of 
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the human race are endowed with a natural urge or tendency 
at one time or another to engage in sexual intercourse with 
a partner of the opposite sex. Certainly, so to speak, 
we all have a 11 sexual preference. 11 So allowing the prosecutrix 
to be examined as to sexual preference regarding intercourse 
on a specific occasion with other men would have nothing 
whatsoever to do with whether she consented on this particular 
occasion. With regards to the sodomy charge, however, because 
it is a different type of sexual act than intercourse, 
perhaps not as widely preferred or accepted, it would be 
relevant to the issue of consent to allow examination about 
the prosecutrix's sexual tendencies or preferences towards 
such a type of sexual act (relevant of course only to the 
issue of consent regarding the sodomy charge). 
Thus, the reason for the trial judge making such 
a ruling is sound and would not have prejudiced the verdict 
of the jury. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF THE 
PROSECUTION'S MOTION IN LIMINE DID NOT 
DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSOR. 
Appellant claims that through the trial court's 
granting of the prosecution's motion in limine, he was prevenU 
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from presenting criminal evidence which with reasonable 
likelihoodwouldhave altered the verdict. ~He further 
claims that such an alleged deprivation was the equivalent 
of a denial of his right to confront his accusor, a right 
guaranteed by both the Utah and the United States Constitutions, 
both explicitly and implicitly, as part of due process. 
The opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court in 
State v. Herrera, supra, is instructive here. The court 
said that a defendant has no constitutional right to ask a 
witness questions which are irrelevant. The court there also 
stated that "reasonable restrictions on a constitutional 
right are permissible." 
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court in State 
v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 580 P.2d 1341 (1978), stated 
that adequate safeguards provided for by statute which exist 
to control the admission of testimony of prior sexual conduct 
of a witness when appropriate in a particular case is not 
violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In conclusion, respondent submits that the evidence 
limited by the trial judge in the instant case was not relevant 
to the issue of the consent, therefore not violative of any 
of appellant's constitutional guarantees. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons heretofore stated, respondent 
submits that the trial court was correct in granting the 
prosecution's motion in limine: for none of the evidence 
contended for by appellant concerning the prosecutrix was 
relevant to the issue of·consent on the various charges. 
Evidence as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the 
community regarding sexual morality was admissible, and 
so ruled the trial court. 
The decisions as to the admissibility of 
evidence and the extent of cross-examination and 
examination are matters which rest largely within the 
discretion of the trial court. Only if this discretion is 
abused will his decisions be reversed on appeal. State v. 
Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015 (1978). Further, even if some 
was made in limiting examination or cross-examination, 
appellant has not shown that such error is prejudicial, 
and as such, the conviction cannot be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for RespondEnt 
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